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Contents

Editorial Note

We would like to begin this note by expressing our gratitude to all the people who had an extremely important role in bringing this journal to life. First and foremost, we are immensely grateful for the guidance provided by the International Relations department, specifically Professor Ananya Sharma, who held our hands at the beginning of this process when we were unsure of how to start on something as ambitious. We're extremely thankful to the external peer reviewers, our editorial board, and the design team who have put multiple hours into this journal over a course of two challenging semesters. We would also like to thank everyone who submitted their pieces to us; thank you for having faith in our vision and work. Last but not least, we would like to thank the Ashoka Society for International Affairs for its unwavering support throughout this process.

When we started working on this journey together, we did not know each other and were simply paired up by the IR Society. However, what made this an enriching process was our shared vision for the journal: we wanted it to be an enterprise that pushed the boundaries of what the discipline of International Relations is commonly understood to be.

International Relations isn't solely about relations between countries; it's imperative that we also discuss the individuals, cultures, and domestic politics that govern the relations between countries. This vision was the driving force behind most of the decisions we took: from building our team of dedicated individuals who both shared and challenged our vision, to narrowing down on the theme of Migrations, Borders and Citizenship.

Throughout this process, we learned so many important lessons, the most important one being that it is hard to plan everything, no matter how much you try to. This journal was completely executed in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, and this meant that multiple unpredictable challenges were thrown at us.

From having submissions withdrawn as authors found it challenging to complete their pieces, to members of the team facing their own personal struggles. We strongly believe that as a team, we navigated these issues with resilience and empathy. There were times when we were not sure if our work would ever see the light of day, but our love for the discipline kept us motivated to bring this out to you.

While the end result is not exactly what we thought it would be back in September 2020, when we started this process, we are incredibly proud of what we have been able to achieve. We believe that this is still an important step in the path of pushing boundaries within the scholarly space of International Relations in India. This is Ashoka's first academic journal dedicated to International Relations, and we hope that even after we leave, this is something that continues as the discipline expands.

Jahnavi Mukul
Thejashri MS
(Editors-in-chief, 2020-21)

Concept Note

The monopoly of the territorially defined sovereign state over the ability to create internationally and legally recognized identities has been weakening. While our world continues to be ordered by the logic of the nation-state, other powerful forces such as globalization have emerged to shape the international order in important ways. Power itself is not a value that nations can continue to lay their exclusive claim to: the ability to influence action, to create community, to affect mobility— all are well within the reach of a largely unregulated technology landscape and integrated, authoritative markets. Thus faced with crisis and change, territoriality now needs to be squared with the increasing shift towards transnational affinities, and the tension between the two informs the themes for this issue of the Ashoka Journal of International Affairs.

a) Migrations

In exploring the concept of migration, we seek to expand its understanding from mere relocation of the individual to the political meanings that the act of departure from the familiar and arrival into the new can take. A move from one place to another is a disruption, and studying migration can help better understand how complex geopolitical realities shape the thinking about this act of change, and the reordering of individual, social, and political relations in its aftermath.

b) Borders

Borders are, in spatial terms, liminal; through this issue, our hope is to better understand the factors that work in tandem to both consolidate as well utilize this liminality. The borders that signify national claim over territories have a significance both physical and political: the former because of their role in the identity formation of both that live within its bounds and those that cross it, and the latter because of how they are the markers of national claims over territories. In exploring their importance, we seek to understand what borders do— actively, but also passively— and the impact that their existence has over the lives and circumstances of those that interact with them.

c) Citizenship

In a global order that is ordered and regulated by the logic of the nation-state, the concept of citizenship has come to occupy political imagination with an intensity that is almost singular. This is because the conceptual claim of citizenship is simultaneously both political and personal: it determines our place in the world relative to other national and international entities, but it also formatively influences our conceptions of the self.

Through this issue, we seek to understand how citizens, non-citizens, and those transitioning from one category to the other, experience the regulatory practices of the nation-state.

These three interconnected themes capture, between them, the frictions of a world increasingly on the move. In bringing them together and exploring them through case studies of a diverse nature, we hope that we can contribute to the creation of a new analytical lens through which emerging patterns of movement in the world can be studied.

(Editorial Board, 2020-21)

Design Editors' Note

We are delighted to be able to present the Ashoka Journal of International Relations (AJIR), a journal from the Ashoka University Society of International Relations. The theme for our first issue is "Migrations, Borders and Citizenship". AJIR presented us with an exciting opportunity to design an academic journal that communicates the expanses of the field, and for that we are grateful.

The objective of our design choices was to present the research pieces in a manner that feels new, yet familiar. To achieve this, we chose a subtle colour palette that feels close to home but changed the tones of the colours to keep it refreshing.

We believe these colours accurately represent what the journal seeks to be. Since red represents danger, the shade we have chosen tones it down and can be read as caution. Membership and borders are matters of conflict as they are not ideal concepts. While they may provide us with a sense of community and stability, they are also vital to the politics of exclusion, and hence, may be a cause for caution.

Blue is the colour of expansiveness and freedom but also depth. A stable nation guarded by its borders, while allowing for migration, provides its people stability while also giving them the room to dream. Lastly, a blue-beige shade was chosen to represent flexibility; borders and citizenships are not engraved in stone, and it is this property that even allows for migration.

We chose these colours to capture the different themes this journal takes on. Themes of diversity, multiculturalism, identity, progress and interconnectedness; and we hope you see it in a similar light. Our design layout is minimal as our focus was on the pieces themselves, not trying to take away from their importance, while also allowing our ideas to have their space.

The uniqueness of the journal is depicted by the pairing of the sans-serif and serif fonts. These fonts signify the balance that each article brings with it— themes of formality and connection between the nations as a whole.

We would like to close off like we started, by expressing gratitude to all those who gave us this opportunity, worked on this journal, and brought it to life.

Urvi Jain
Akshara Kulkarni
(Design Editors, 2020-21)

Theme

Migrations, Borders and Citizenship

The Framing of the Refugee:

An Exploration of the Feminization of Refugee Camps

Kalyani Garud

Abstract

This paper seeks to identify and explain how spaces such as refugee camps, and the displaced individuals that inhabit them are feminized vis-a-vis the imposed and internalized perceptions of the refugee. It is founded in larger theoretical literature on international norms regarding the treatment and perception of refugees in conjunction with case studies of refugee camps in the Global South. The paper argues that refugee camps are feminized as the outside gaze views them as passive and non-threatening areas and also evaluates how the empowerment of women in these camps further leads to the feminization of the camps.

This is explored, first, through the international norms which dictate the "ideal" or "good" behaviour of displaced persons. The essay argues that migratory refugees who refuse to stay within the confines of the boundaries of refugee camps are hyper-masculinized. By transgressing the norms and choosing to seek asylum, these migrants are viewed by the populations and governments of their host countries and the larger international community as "aggressive" and "threatening." In contrast, the "true" or "passive" that live in camps are seen to be docile and non-threatening, in fact, they are seen as victims of aggression that are in need of international aid. Refugee camps are then feminized through the international gaze.

Secondly, the paper argues that the conditions of the camps themselves are a catalyst for the feminization of the refugees in the way that they view themselves and the greater demographics of the area. For many, and especially the men, the sudden loss of control and imposition of severe restrictions is deeply emasculating.

Often, it is the men who seek to migrate out of the refugee camps in search of work while the women and children continue to stay on, thus numerically creating a gender imbalance within the camps with women forming the larger share of the population. While the men are viewed as threats to the local populations, women are not. This leads to women possessing higher mobility and thus are freer to contribute economically to their households in lieu of the men. In addition to this, several programs that are run at refugee camps are specifically designed to empower women that bring them to the forefront of these camps.

I. Introduction

At the end of 2019, according to United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) data, there were over 26 million refugees, the highest number of displaced people seeking asylum[1]. This translates to one displaced person every three seconds[2]. Aid and shelter are provided to these forcibly displaced persons in refugee camps in countries neighbouring their conflict-ridden home countries. This paper seeks to identify and explain how spaces of the likes of refugee camps and the displaced individuals that inhabit them are feminized vis-a-vis the imposed and internalized perceptions of the refugee.

Borrowing from Hyndman's definition of feminization, this paper observes feminization to be a "shift in gender relations towards those considered 'female' or feminine"[3]. This gendering of the spatial boundaries of refugee camps is intricately linked to the perception of the refugees themselves. The process of feminization is one that draws from externally imposed understandings of the people and the space they occupy as well as an internal shift in their own self-perception. Drawing from

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[1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Figures at a Glance," accessed January 4, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.

[2] "Refugee Statistics." Accessed January 4, 2021. https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/.

[3] Hyndman, Jennifer, and Wenona Giles. "Waiting for what? The feminization of asylum in protracted situations." *Gender, Place & Culture* 18, no. 3 (2011): 363

international relations theory, the paper focuses on how general societal perceptions of refugees engender a situation wherein refugee camps, sedentary refugees, and migratory refugees are understood within the constraints of the gender binary. It finds that the feminization and the processes that enable the phenomenon are deeply connected with identity and culture.

II. External Gaze

The following section aims to investigate the imposed feminization upon the refugees by the international community. The factors explored include questions surrounding identity perception and threat of moving refugees. It evaluates the differences in the perception of stationary refugees and migratory refugees, and how their treatment genders both the populations as well as the spaces they inhabit.

II (a) Between Refugees and Migrants- The Creation of a Gendered Divide

To explore how the spaces of the likes of refugee camps are feminized by the external gaze, one must first explore how gender binaries are created and imposed on imagined groups,and on the characteristics of refugees. It is through the hypermasculinization of migratory refugees, that stationary refugees are inadvertently feminized. There is an imagination and a reimagination of displaced persons through a gendered lens vis-à-vis the spaces they occupy.

Mona Domosh and Joni Seager have argued that "spacial binaries are gender-coded: the feminine is the domestic space of home while the masculine is the public space"[4]. Refugee camps are temporary homes for displaced persons, their elementary purpose is to provide immediate shelter and relief. Although their intended function is temporary, camps often house refugees for decades. UNHCR data observes that between 1993 and 2003, the average waiting time for refugees increased from nine years to seventeen years[5].

[4] Hyndman, Jennifer, and Wenona Giles. "Waiting for what? The feminization of asylum in protracted situations." *Gender, Place & Culture* 18, no. 3 (2011): 367.

[5] *Ibid* pp. 362.

Refugee camps are designed to limit the geographical movement of refugees further into the host countries as most refugees are not legally allowed to leave the areas designated to them. Furthermore, as spaces that are allocated to refugees, they are seen as the 'rightful' places where refugees should stay until they are either granted asylum or are able to return to their home countries. Public spaces, in this case, would then be the spaces outside refugee camps, spaces which the citizens of the host country have access to while the domestic space would be the refugee camps and settlements. The extensive restrictions placed upon refugees that are designed to limit their movements out of their camps take away the refugees' agency of movement thus feminizing the camps by restricting the refugee to domestic space. Refugees within the camps are also entirely dependent on benefactory aid for their survival, thereby manufacturing a dependency that contributes to the attribution of feminine qualities to refugees in camps. In addition to this, by extension, masculine qualities are transferred and associated with the migratory refugees who do venture out into the public areas leaving behind the domestic. Their presence in public spaces is uncomfortable for the host population since it defies the status quo. The masculine traits of defiance, aggression and movement are juxtaposed with the feminine traits of compliance, passivity and dependency. The gender binary that is created is symbiotic: the masculinization of one affects the feminization of the other and vice versa.

II (b) The Politics of the Global North and the Global South – Who is a "tr Refugee?

Most of the world's refugee camps are set up in the Global South itself, in the countries neighbouring the refugees' home countries that they have fled from. The five largest refugee camps in the world are situated in Bangladesh, Uganda, Kenya, Jordan and Tanzania.[6] Migratory refugees attempting immigration into the Global North from their countries of origin in the Global South are viewed through the lens of distrust and are labelled as threats. The dynamic between the treatment of refugees in the Global North

[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Figures at a Glance," accessed January 4, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.

and the Global South is noteworthy because it brings to light the question of where refugees belong. The stringent anti-immigration policies of the Global North designed to disincentivize migration, coupled with the large amounts of aid and sponsorship directed to the upkeep of camps in the Global South completes the picture of the Western countries investing heavily in keeping the refugees confined in the southern hemisphere[7]. Essentially, the issue of migratory refugees is magnified and multiplied as refugees attempt to cross over into the Global North.

The issue of immigration, then, is larger than the movement of refugees from one country to another; it carries heavy undertones of civilizational and cultural conflict. The threat of the migratory asylum seekers, particularly those attempting to cross over into the Global North, is both physical and cultural. Migratory asylum seekers are categorized and villainized as the 'other' who not only drain physical resources that rightfully belong to the host country's citizens, but also whose presence, especially in large populations, threatens the cultural demographic of the land. The "other" threatens the sovereignty, economy and culture of the countries that they cross into.

The sedentary nature of the refugees is contrasted to the migratory nature of asylum seekers, the hypermasculinization of the latter contributes to the feminized perception of the former. Since the actions of the migratory refugee are perceived as aggressive and threatening, by the virtue of not attempting migration, the sedentary refugee is seen as non-aggressive and non-threatening. Hyndman and Giles also note that the "The legitimacy of the refugee on the move, beyond such spaces, changes political valence dramatically, from innocent, helpless and deserving to politically dangerous, self-interested and undeserving."[8] Migratory refugees have been described in a dehumanizing manner as "swarms, rapists, disease carriers and job predators", while the representation of sedentary refugees have not been handled through the same violent lens.

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[7] Khattab, Nabil, and Hasan Mahmud. "Migration in a turbulent time: perspectives from the global South." (2019): 1-6.

[8] *Hyndman, Jennifer, and Wenona Giles.* "Waiting for what? The feminization of asylum in protracted situations" *Gender, Place, Culture* 18, *no. 3 (2011): 367*

The stationary refugee is "deserving of aid" while the migrant is undeserving because of the perceived "selfishness" of their actions of refusing the aid provided at camps, however meagre, and venturing out to demand a better life at the cost of their host countries resources.

Proximity to the other is a critical factor in the arguments of who is to be protected and from whom. Sarah Ahmed notes that "the threat to the subject [the white populations of the Global North] is the proximity to the imagined other [the non- white refugee populations]"[9].The potential actions of the migratory refugees are read by the residents of the Global North in forms of rape and molestation against their resident population. This creates an emotional response against the migrant, who is assumed to be a dominant and aggressive man, and threatens the bodily integrity of the residents as well as the cultural and territorial integrity of the nations.

On the other hand, the refugees in camps are themselves seen as victims of rape and murder, ones that have fled violent situations with only their lives and are now seeking safety from the violence of their past in refugee camps. The refugees are seen predominantly as women and children, who have been victims of this violence, who are vulnerable in the hands of the benevolent humanitarian aid of international organisations like the United Nations. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations issued a press statement explicitly stating that "genuine refugees are victims of terrorism themselves; they are not terrorists"[10]. Their statement not only reinforces the idea that "genuine refugees" need to be protected from the terrorists but also raises the questions of the features that constitute a "genuine refugee." Does it assume that if a refugee who is not genuine, according to the standards set by a foreign entity for a "genuine refugee," can immediately be likened to a terrorist? In analysing the public conceptions of "bogus"

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[9] Ahmed, Sara. "Affective economies." Social text 22, no. 2 (2004): 118.

[10] *Schmid, Alex P.* "Links between terrorism and migration." *International Centre For Counter Terrorism (ICCT) ICCT Research Paper (2016).*

refugees, Ahmed likens the emotive imagination of "bogus" to the figure of "boogey-man," further emphasising the gendered narrative of who poses a threat to the residents of the host country[11]. The feminisation of the refugees is what makes them populations which need to be protected while the masculinisation of the asylum seekers posits them as a danger to western society, culture and ways of life.

II (c) Bare Life Politics – Imposed Feminization

Furthermore, the discourse on aid that is distributed to refugee camps is one of "philanthropy or humanitarian obligation, not an entitlement"[12]. Bare Life policies provide refugees with the minimum material essentials that they need to survive, not because they have the right to live, but because certain states have acted generously and provided them with humanitarian relief. As refugee camps are built with the notions of the temporary residential status of the refugees that inhabit it, the focus on material and physical health eludes the conditions necessary for the psychological wellbeing of the refugees in the long-term. However, the reality of the situation on the ground is that many refugees spend decades in exile away from their home countries in these refugee camps. Hyndman notes that as the "temporariness [of the humanitarian character of refugee camps] becomes more permanent, this space shrinks because other basic human rights are being suspended or denied"[13]. The beneficiaries of the international aid are both men and women who have been stripped of their individual rights and identities grouped into "masses of liminal beings" who live in a limbo between today and tomorrow. These men and women, to be classified as "genuine" or "real" refugees, have to passively wait in their temporal settings with only a sliver of hope of being granted asylum by the countries hosting them.

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[11] Ahmed, Sara. "Affective economies."; *Social text* 22, no. 2 (2004): 123

[12] Hyndman, Jennifer, and Wenona Giles. "Waiting for what? The feminization of asylum in protracted situations." *Gender, Place & Culture* 18, no. 3 (2011): 367

[13] *Ibid pp. 373*

III. External Gaze

The feminisation of refugees at camps is not only an external phenomenon but one that is internalised by its residents as well. Two major activities contribute to the internal feminisation of the camps; first, the dependency on aid coupled with the loss of autonomy and independence that the refugee populations face and second, women empowerment centric developmental processes which leads to the restructuring of the gendered roles of the economic responsibilities within the familial structure. This subsection draws heavily from case studies to highlight and illustrate real life examples of how these elements of feminization interact and affect the refugee populations. The case studies have been chosen from refugee camps in the Global South as the paper hopes to understand how the processes of feminization take place from a perspective that has not been explored in the previous subsection. By looking at case studies of how refugees from the Global South stay in camps in the Global South, one is able to draw specific inferences about how the internal mechanisms of feminization take hold independently of the external gaze of the international body.

III (a) Emasculation and the Changing Demographic

Complete dependency on the UNHCR and the inability to take back control of their own lives emasculates refugees damaging their self-perception. The psychological trauma of having to flee their homes is exacerbated by the restrictive conditions of camps especially under bare life policies. For example, the majority of the refugees at the Kanembwa Camp are entirely dependent on UNHCR for the provision of their food and other supplies because their movements outside the camp were completely restricted by the Tanzanian government. They are also unable to engage in economic activities within the camp to regain some semblance of autonomy because of insufficient funds to start a business or the very limited number of employment and volunteering jobs that the UNHCR offered to the refugees.

The aid that they receive is just enough to sustain them, their meagre rations are not enough for them to prosper economically. Here, it is important to recount how refugee camps in themselves are constructions of temporality, by their very design and purpose they are not supposed to house refugees for extended amounts of time. The loss of agency results in a collective loss of purpose for many of those at the camp, particularly amongst the men, who are unable to economically provide for their families and remain passive as their existence is subject to the UNHCR aid [14]. Furthermore, as Lukunka observes in her research with Burundian refugees, the refugees felt like aid organisations had become the "new big men"[15]. The structural passivity and dependency of refugee camps is as much an emasculating internal voice that feminizes the refugee's self-perception as it is an external gaze through which others see the refugees.

Alternatively, the consequences of the psychological pressures of 'being a man' also affect the demographics of refugee camps. For example, following their arrival to refugee camps and upon finding insufficient opportunities for "acceptable or sufficient work," Somalian men migrated within Kenya or to other neighbouring countries to look for work, often leaving their wives and children behind in the camps[16]. The men who remained at camps, frustrated with their desolate and seemingly powerless situations resorted to intoxication and therefore "became useless", which further put the economic burden of earning money on the women [17]. Linking this back to the previous subsection on the external gaze, those who ventured out into the public space were masculinized while those who remained in the domestic spaces were feminized. The degeneration of traditional cultural notions of men being the sole breadwinners and heads of households put enormous psychological pressure on the refugee men. Some struggle to regain some semblance of control of their life through vices such as "the chewing of Khat" and physical abuse directed towards their wives and children[18].

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[14] Lukunka, Barbra. "New big men: Refugee emasculation as a human security issue." *International Migration* 50, no. 5 (2012): 134.

[15] Ibid pp. 135.

[16] Ritchie, Holly A. "Gender and enterprise in fragile refugee settings: female empowerment amidst male emasculation—a challenge to local integration?." *Disasters* 42 (2018): S47.

[17] Ibid

[18] Lukunka, Barbra. "New big men: Refugee emasculation as a human security issue." *International Migration* 50, no. 5 (2012): 135

Nonetheless, women persevere through these conditions, often for the sake of their children, which led to the feminisation of the spaces as a direct consequence of women coming to the forefront of economic and social organisation at camps.

III (b) Economic Mobilization of Women

The gendered binary of viewing the masculine as threatening and the feminine as non-threatening affect the opportunities that refugees have access to. This bias disproportionately favours refugee women as they are not seen as aggressive or violent beings. In 2014, the Jordanian government increased the surveillance of Syrian working men and reduced the World Food Program's aid vouchers that were distributed to the refugees[19]. This situation forced many Syrian women to step outside the domestic sphere since they faced far less monitoring than the men and could earn some income for their families. Lukunka observes that "in Irbid and Zarqa [refugee camps in Jordan], research participants emphasised that at least one-half of women refugees had become the main 'breadwinners' " of the household[20]. Interestingly, the intermingling of the Jordanian and Syrian norms has also led to empowerment of Syrian women. Ritchie argues that "changes in Syrian women's norms arguably have gathered extra momentum from the local 'progressive' environment in Jordan, where local women are educated, marry later, and work"[21]. The traditional Syrian norms of women being domestic beings and men being the public beings was broken because of both situational and cultural changes. Policies enacted by countries hosting refugees, like the countries of the Global North, also view the "masculine" as posing a threat to their own nation. This is why the male population of "undesirables" is separated from society in camps and put under strict surveillance[22]. However, the women who engage in work, still primarily do the traditional "work of women," working as domestic help or running tailoring or food businesses, they do not venture out into the "masculine" fields of work such as construction work which the men primarily partook in.

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19 Szparaga, Andrew E. "The Effect of the Syrian Crisis on Jordanian Internal Security." (2014).

20 Ritchie, Holly A. "Gender and enterprise in fragile refugee settings: female empowerment amidst male emasculation—a challenge to local integration?" *Disasters* 42 (2018): S47

21 Ibid

22 Martin, Diana, Claudio Minca, and Irit Katz. "Rethinking the camp: On spatial technologies of power and resistance." *Progress in Human Geography* 44, no. 4 (2020): 7.

By categorically ensuring that masculine elements that the refugees possess are subdued while the feminine is highlighted, governmental policies therefore contribute to the feminisation of spaces.

III (c) The Empowerment of Women

The feminization of refugee camps is a cyclical process. The external view of the refugee camps is characterised by the narrative of vulnerable women and children, consequently, the aid that the refugees receive is specifically tailored to help and empower these vulnerable women. This, in turn, further reinforces the idea of women being at the forefront of the refugee camps. It, then, intrinsically leads to the conceptualisation of these spaces of refugee camps as feminine. The feminisation of the refugee camps also means that women's positions and situations are recognised and prioritised over those of the men. Ritchie states that "refugee women may also receive targeted economic assistance from aid agencies, with refugee men increasingly excluded and unrecognised" [23]. At the Kanembwa Camp, women were given access to seminars aimed at their education and empowerment on the subjects like "HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence, and parenting skills" in addition to access to centres which addressed domestic violence[24].

IV. Conclusion

The process of feminization of sedentary refugees and refugee camps is one that is actively and subconsciously promoted by the consequences of the mechanisms and policies of refugee camps. The association of passivity, dependency and compliance to refugee camps is not the only way in which feminization takes place. It is also through the changing social demographic and measures that empower women and bring them to the forefront of economic and social activity that their existence is acknowledged and prioritized. The gendered binary between the hyper-masculinized migratory refugee is

[23] Ritchie, Holly A. "Gender and enterprise in fragile refugee settings: female empowerment amidst male emasculation—a challenge to local integration?." *Disasters* 42 (2018): S41.

[24] Lukunka, Barbra. "New big men: Refugee emasculation as a human security issue." *International Migration* 50, no. 5 (2012): 135.

juxtaposed with the feminized stationary refugee which creates a positive feedback loop that further assists the subconscious external conceptualization of the 'true' refugee, one who is imagined as a feminized being.

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Citizenship on the Margins:

Exploring Marriage Migration in East Asia

Shubhangi Tiwari

Abstract

When women from low-income countries in East Asia, such as Vietnam, migrate to other nearby countries such as Taiwan with better economic prospects for the purposes of marriage, the challenges of assimilation and integration they face are compounded by their gender, class, and ethnicity. These systems of discrimination are driven by motivations of economic profit, and have long treated immigrant women who marry into their countries as either cheap labour for the poorly paid non-specialized worforce, or as domestic labour in the lower income economic groups where native male-female ratios are dismal– thus dehumanizing them by determining their worth solely by the value their labour can provide both inside familial structures and in larger economic systems. Under international pressure and responding to persistent activism by feminist groups, these nations have tried to address this crisis by creating formal criteria that facilitates easier granting of citizenship to them upon meeting certain criteria. While easier access to formal citizenship was intended at increasing the legal remedies available to women when faced with discrimination on racial, economic or sexist grounds after marriage into the destination country, the impact of these measures remains limited because solutions such as these ignore the larger economic and familial structures that the lives of these migrant women is embedded in. In this paper, I explore the space created between formal and substantive citizenship for these migrant brides by problematizing the value of legal citizenship when faced with the intricacies of disadvantaged social positions, and the ways in which traditional social structures combined with modern economic demands situate migrant women in especially precarious social spaces and limit the legal remedies available to them.

Keywords: Citizenship, Women, Marriage, Migration

The advent of the twenty-first century has been marked by a historic rise in international migration in Asia, reaching levels never seen before in any other recorded period in history. Aided by forces of globalisation and prompted by changing cultural norms and demographic trends, transnational migration is now permanently shaping societies by creating new hierarchies and dismantling old ones.

Most of the immigration scholarship that seeks to study patterns of migration in East and Southeast Asian countries conforms to a normative analysis of citizenship, by studying the state-citizen relationship as one with a defined end– the assimilation of the immigrant into the destination country after becoming a naturalized citizen. Thus, while the motivations of the migrant who seeks such citizenship, as well as the concerns and calculations that drive the action of the state when making the decision of granting citizenship to a person not born in the nation, are well studied and conceptualized, the shift in this relationship– from state- migrant to state-citizen– and the parallel developments it causes in the social positioning of the migrant turned citizen remain underexplored.

Marriage migration is broadly defined as the practice of a person relocating from his native place of residence for the explicit purpose of marriage . Two noteworthy characteristics have been found to be associated with the pattern of marriage migration in particular. First, it is unidirectional, which means that it involves women moving from less economically developed countries to more economically developed ones, and it is important to note that the economic status of both the home and destination countries here signifies more than their financial health; it is also a proxy for the linked development markers that follow from it, for example, better access to education and healthcare, and

[1] Wei-Jun Jean Yeung and Zheng Mu, "Migration and marriage in Asian contexts," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 14(2019).

greater parity in opportunities available to everyone, here especially women . Second, marriage migration as a phenomenon does not exist in a vacuum, isolated from other factors that cause and affect migration; which means that the practice of marriage as means gaining a port of entry to another country works in tandem with larger[2] processes of labour demand and supply. However, as we will see in the case of Vietnamese women who immigrate to Taiwan, marriage migration is not just a new way to describe dislocation in search for employment– but marriage is the primary act that is consequently followed by the immersion[3] of these migrant women into the formal and informal economic sectors of their destination country.

In this paper, I argue that the political rights of migrant women who undertake migration with the demonstrated intent and purpose of marriage cannot be guaranteed in the destination country by the provision of citizenship as a consequence of marrying an existing citizen, but require a broader understanding of the means through which citizenship operationalizes; and the ways in which the non-substantive nature of legal citizenship in East Asian contexts is gendered. Additionally, I will highlight the ways in which a born citizen and a naturalized citizen interact with the state are notably different, and the conditions for this interaction that are largely defined by the set of limitations that are produced by the social positioning of the immigrant turned citizen.

For the concerns of this paper, migration and marriage need to be highlighted as part of a cause-action process that occurs one way, which is to say that the act of moving away from one's native country to another is undertaken with the express intent to marry a citizen of the destination country, and not the other way around where marriage is a collateral outcome of a person migrating for different reasons.

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2 Hong-zen Wang and Danièle Bélanger, "Taiwanizing female immigrant spouses and materializing differential citizenship," Citizenship Studies 12, no. 1 (2008).

3 Pei-Chia Lan, "Migrant Women's Bodies as Boundary Markers: Reproductive Crisis and Sexual Control in the Ethnic Frontiers of Taiwan," Signs: Journal in Women in Culture and Society 33, no. 4 (2008).

It is also important to note that since most, if not all, societies in East Asia, like much of the world, are both patrilineal and deeply patriarchal, the expectation upon marriage, whether it is intra community or inter community, is that the bride leaves her native home to live with the groom, and often his family as traditional norms dictate. This also explains why marriage migration as a phenomenon is almost always marked by the transnational movement of women.

I. Citizenship and its discontents

Citizenship, when studied through the lens of the political status that it creates for its holder, can broadly be classified into two categories: formal and substantive. As Apichai Shipper has noted, formal citizenship is membership in a nation state or political community, and while persons with formal citizenship can be regarded as nationals, it does not signify whether they possess citizenship rights. Substantive citizenship, in contrast, is defined as the possession of a body of civil, political and social rights. As an extension, it often also imposes obligations as well as engendered lived experiences.[4]

In Taiwan, like most East and Southeast Asian countries, laws that grant formal citizenship are based on the principle of jus sanguinis, which means that nationality is granted to a person whose father or mother is, at the time of birth, a national of that country. However, as societies undergo structural changes owing to the forces of modernity, in many countries, including Taiwan, formal citizenship has expanded to also include, either formally or informally, some form of modified jus soli where citizenship is ascribed to all persons born in the territory.[5]

However, a comprehensive framework that recognizes citizenship as a necessary precondition for concrete movement in the direction of a citizen's complete integration into the political community of a nation must demarcate formal citizenship from

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4 Apichai W. Shipper, "Introduction: Politics of Citizenship and Transnational Gendered Migration in East and Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1 (2010).

5 Shipper.

substantive citizenship not simply based on the way that state treats a citizen and grants him or her access to its political processes, but also taking into account the contingencies on which this transition is made, and the how they operate differentially for born citizens compared to naturalized citizens.

For natural born citizens, citizenship is an absolute right– conferred upon them at birth and impossible to revoke until they give it up willingly, thus creating a sense of permanence and indispensability in the way born citizens are perceived by the state, even if their interactions with the state machinery are minimal or result in unfavourable outcomes. The final authority on how they associate and negotiate with the state is the parent state itself, both in terms of provision of resources depending on their needs, as well as the ramifications if the terms of these interactions as set by the state are not met. In any of these events, a born citizen always remains a national subject, which means the state cannot shirk off its relationship with a born citizen at any point out of its own accord– the citizen is an equally, if not more, powerful actor in determining the point of termination of the relationship.

This is in stark contrast to the way the dynamics between the state and a naturalized citizen operate. An immigrant gains citizenship on terms dictated by the state, by meeting conditions that are outlined not just in terms of the formal relationship the immigrant is allowed to have with his or her native country, but also expectations of a 'model citizen' that the state wants him or her to conform to. This can often include demonstrated skill or expertise in a field, or a certain reservoir of accumulated capital, or continued utility to the state's prerogatives. The fact that none of these are applicable to born citizens can be explained by the logic that nation stateswork on– which mandates a certain earning of citizenship for those not native to the place. But it is important to note that these conditions are also future oriented– which means that they continue to hold even after people, both born and naturalized, come under the same legal category of 'citizen.'

It is important to recognize for this reason that the legal framework that decides the formal conditions and procedures which need to be met for the granting of citizenship creates a facetious, simple binary between citizens and non-citizens (here, migrants) where the only difference between them is the possession of a document. In reality, however, there exist degrees of legitimacy to the claim of citizenship itself. The membership of a political community, here, the state, is realistically never uniform even within the horizontal cross section of persons who occupy the same legal status in the eyes of the law. It is marked by degrees of inclusion and exclusion, put into practice through hierarchised social practices and discriminatory political perceptions. It is for this reason that legal citizens are not a homogenous political category, and the circumstances of their citizenship– birth or naturalization– are central to the degree of membership of the political community that are made available to them.

Article 19 of the Nationality Act of Taiwan, which is the specific piece of legislation that regulates all matters concerning citizenship, states that the Ministry of the Interior can revoke such citizenship granted to naturalized citizens (a disproportionate number of which are Vietnamese women) if the naturalization application was not in accordance with the requirements of the law, which are described under Article 3.[6] In a number of cases, as a result of the application of these provisions, the Ministry of Interior revokes the Taiwanese citizenship of marriage immigrants after court convictions for committing fraudulent marriage. However, 'fraudulent marriage' is a very broad legal category, and unilateral legal application of these laws ignores the dynamics of power and structural asymmetries that govern the marriage economy in the region. Coming from deprived socio-economic backgrounds, many marriage immigrants suffer from language barrier; this is compounded by the lack of information and knowledge about the laws in Taiwan because these marriages are often brokered by third party agents in exchange for an agreed sum of money, and their positioning as a non-member of the ingroup in their destination country results in the lack of legal assistance for their defence in court.

[6] Website of the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China(Taiwan). Retrieved from https://www.moi.gov.tw/english/english_law/law_detail.aspx?sn=332

Furthermore, 'fraudulent marriage' can be reported by anyone, including but not limited to friends, family and in-laws for any reason. This opens innumerable avenues for exploitation of the migrant women at the hand of others, because their need to keep their citizenship effectively becomes the condition for which they can be held hostage, with their compliance the price that they have to pay as ransom. Additionally, even in cases where these migrant women are found to be guilty of small instances of fraud such as mismatch of the names on certificates or the entry of incorrect age on their application for citizenship, it has often been observed that the Ministry of Interior revokes the citizenship of these women even when the courts rule that a penalization of such magnitude is not necessary because the degree of fraud is found to be very small, and often not committed with any malicious intent but simple ignorance. This is not to say that ignorance of the law is an acceptable reason for having broken it or that intent is the centrepiece of legal arbitration, but mindless application in such cases is an indicator of the refusal to engage with and contextualise the position of these women in their native and destination nations, and the degree of agency that is available to them.

The act of revoking citizenship on grounds that are not defined in legally watertight terms but can be flexibly used by convenience by both the state as well as other people against migrant women is especially contentious when the preliminary condition for the granting of citizenship is taken into account. The Nationality Act also dictates that foreigners, when applying to become naturalized Taiwanese citizens, must submit a "certification of his/her loss of previous nationality."[7] This means that the revocation of citizenship of the migrant women leaves them stateless, with neither their native country to go back to, nor their destination country a legally sanctioned option.

It becomes important to draw a comparative between citizens by birth and naturalised citizens here again, because of the conditionality of their citizenship status that this points towards. Revocation of citizenship is not a politically or legally new phenomenon, and

[7] Website of the Ministry of the Interior, Republic of China(Taiwan). Retrieved from https://www.moi.gov.tw/english/english_law/law_detail.aspx?sn=332

certainly not one unique to Taiwan. In recent times, the rise of terrorist outfits has led to Western countries creating detailed guidelines for the revocation of citizenship of persons who choose to flee and join terrorist activities that harm the interests of the state. However, the difference here is that the act is initiated by the citizen as a political actor himself, when he or she chooses to actively and intentionally cause damage to state security or sovereignty.

As Aihwa Ong has argued, despite policies that prescribe uniform and universalistic treatment of newcomers, the actions of governments produce categories of immigrants that draw heavily on historically situated social constructions of class, ethnicity, race and gender.[8] Taking into account these social factors is important because they help explain the powerless positioning of migrant brides that explains both their inability to experience substantive citizenship as discussed above, as well as the constraints on their social and economic mobility.

Scholars such as Pei-Chia Lan have argued that cross-border marriage migration should be linked to the cross-border migration of domestic workers because the similarities between foreign brides and foreign maids is based on their place at the 'intersection of globalisation and nationalism' and that they represent 'a class specific solution to the alleged shortage of reproductive labour.'[9] As elsewhere, 'Taiwanese working-class men seek cross-border marriages not just to end their bachelorhood: they also need the unpaid labour of foreign spouses to assist with agricultural production in farming households and the reproduction of the next generation.'[10] Other similar links have been drawn between cross-border marriage, domestic work and female marriage migrants as reproductive workers who take the roles more affluent women refuse. Bridget Anderson has also importantly observed that in acquiring domestic labour, families are effectively buying 'personhood'[11] and this is even more the case when that domestic labour or sexual labour is provided by a wife for free and unspoiled by any commercial

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[8] Aihwa Ong, "Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States," Current Anthropology 37, no. 5 (1996).

[9] Pei-Chia Lan, "Migrant Women's Bodies as Boundary Markers: Reproductive Crisis and Sexual Control in the Ethnic Frontiers of Taiwan," Signs: Journal in Women in Culture and Society 33, no. 4 (2008): 834.

[10] Lan, 840.

[11] Bridget Anderson, "A Very Private Business: Migration and Domestic Work," European Journal of Women's Studies 14, no. 3 (2007).

transactions. The idea of buying personhood is particularly important in the case of marriage migrants, because it deposits their value in the act of transaction. This effectively means that even when membership to the political community is facilitated by the state through the granting of citizenship, these women remain excluded from the social community. Their roles as wives and mothers contribute to the reproductive and care economy without formal recognition, and their social value is not estimated in terms of the familial structure that they seek to be integrated within through marriage, but is constructed in terms of the vacant roles they fill as left by native women, reducing them to a permanent secondary status.

II. Case Study: Vietnamese migrant brides in Taiwan

The scale of migration both within and from Asia has seen a massive increase in the last two decades, and while the trend of more women migrating than men has been observed to be a global phenomenon, the disparity stands out particularly in the case of East Asia. This staggering increase in migration numbers has largely been attributed to the flow of labour capital as globalisation opens up transnational supply chains and the demand for cheap manual labour in mass production industries increases, with women making up the bulk of this unorganised and underpaid labour workforce. However, the curious migratory pattern in East Asia is better explained by factoring in the rising trend of 'marriage migration,' which is used to signify the migration of East Asian women in order to marry men resident in other countries.

The defining demographic trends in Taiwan, like most other countries in East Asia, are the delay of marriage and the increasing proportion of women who remain single.[12] As is characteristic, the marriage market also works on the simple calculus of demand and supply. High economic growth rate in Taiwan has resulted in women gaining the means to shrug off the traditional burden of childcare and homemaking that has traditionally been

[12] Gavin Jones, "The "Flight from Marriage" in South-East and East Asia," in (Un)Tying the Knot: Ideal and Reality in Asian Marriage, eds. Gavin Jones and Kamalini Ramdas. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2004).

imposed on them because of societal expectations. According to estimates by Kawaguchi and Lee, a college-educated woman in Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan is 50% to 200% more likely to remain single than her counterpart with no tertiary degree. In 2005, one out of every six women between the ages of 35 and 39, in both Japan and Taiwan, was single.[13] This situation is referred to as "marriage squeeze."

As a solution to this problem, the Taiwanese government changed its policy on foreign spouses from exclusion to inclusion after 2002 by offering to the migrant spouses entitlement of social rights, including easier access to the job market, free Mandarin language instruction and public health coverage.[14]

However, this shift in cultural norms has fractures both on class and generational lines. East Asian societies are traditionally structured on a "hypergamy" model, whereby women are expected to seek a spouse of equal or high socio-economic status. This not only means that class mobility of families operationalizes through the vertical movement of women in the economic hierarchy of the society, in practice it also translates to fewer women being available for participation in the marriage economy in the lower strata of the society. This happens because the availability of opportunities for economic independence means more and more women either opt out of marriage entirely, or defer it to a later age, and the remaining women choose to marry upwards of their own economic status, leaving economically disadvantaged men especially worse off.

Additionally, Taiwan has a very low birth rate and the reproductive economy of the rural population is dictated by the need for children, specifically male heirs, to both assist in manual labour as well as the passing down of property rights as is the norm in most patrilineal societies. A plausible solution to this has been assumed to be cross-border brides who can raise this rate and produce and care for a sizable percentage of Taiwanese children.[15]

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[13] John West, Asian Century Institute, accessed August 07, 2020. Retrieved fromhttps://asiancenturyinstitute.com/migration/178-marriage-migration-in-east-asia

[14] Hong-zen Wang and Danièle Bélanger, "Taiwanizing female immigrant spouses and materializing differential citizenship," Citizenship Studies 12, no. 1 (2008).

[15] W. -S. Yang and M. Schoonheim, "Minority Group Status and Fertility: The Case of the 'Foreign Brides' in Taiwan." In Asian Cross-border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues. IIAS Publication Series, ed. W.-S. Yang and M.C.-W Lu. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

Hence, while female attitudes in marriage in Taiwan have seen a shift away from tradition, especially in the upper classes, it remains a strong norm for men in their 30s and 40s, faced by a shortage of eligible native women of marriageable age and the need to further the family line, and international marriage has become a common strategy for single men, resulting in increasing numbers of female migrants settling in Taiwan through marriage since the end of the 1980s. This results in men with a low socio-economic status (farmer or lower- skilled job) being much more likely to have an immigrant wife, though these immigrant wives often have secondary education and possess college degrees themselves.

The only way for foreign spouses to legalize their stay, either temporarily or, as is more common, permanently, in Taiwan is through their husbands or children. As Wang and Bélangerhe have argued, the fact that immigrant spouses do not have any identity of their own as immigrants is "strongly tied to the imagined nationhood based on the principle of patriarchal jus sanguinis."[16]Consequently, policies made for their assimilation problematize these immigrants by simultaneously gendering and racializing them.

While the state and society actively pursue the integration of immigrant spouses by making policies that can open avenues to experience citizenship in a substantive sense, discourse about immigrant spouses does not match the objective of genuinely integrating them into Taiwanese society. As Wang and Bélangerhe further note, a closer analysis of policies, academic discourse and NGOs fundraising strategies reveals that the Taiwanese society is undergoing a nation-building process and needs an 'Other' to locate itself in the international community, for which purpose a system of differential citizenship is created to distinguish 'them' from 'us'.[17] Both legal and social citizenships are constructed through differentiated practices based on ethnicity, class and gender.

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[16] Hong-zen Wang and Danièle Bélanger, "Taiwanizing female immigrant spouses and materializing differential citizenship," Citizenship Studies 12, no. 1 (2008).

[17] Wang and Bélanger.

Lastly, marriage through commercialised means between men from developed nations and women from poor ones furthers the deep fault lines of class and gender that have come to characterise East Asian societies. Vietnamese brides in Taiwan, thus, need to be situated in the complex nexus of divergences borne out of globalization and regional inequalities of their own positioning. As Suzuki has pointed out, women in cross-border marriages are often marginalised because their husbands too are marginalised and labelled as 'non-elite, divorced, unattractive, violent males'.[18] Lucy Williams further argues that the negative stereotyping of husbands reflects on the wives who are stereotyped as poor and needy yet simultaneously scheming and calculating. These negative images of cross-border and especially 'brokered' marriages– born out of financial transactions and non-traditional means– put pressure on marriages and may contribute to the high incidence of violence reported in cross-border marriages.[19] Lastly, and very importantly, Suzuki also notes how women operate under the continuous pressure of presenting themselves as good wives and mothers to counter the pervasive stereotype of them as "bad girls, entertainers and whores".[20] This furthers the transactional, and often contingent nature of citizenship– citizens by birth are within the ingroup of the society by default, but migrant wives have to keep performing their roles of the traditionally acceptable woman to have access to substantive citizenship.

III. Conclusion: Deserving Subjects of Rights

Marriage migrants are a heterogenous group; while the common denominator of their association remains marriage often brokered by third parties and subsequent migration to another country, their experiences are unique as a product of the families that they marry into and the economic and social trajectories that their lives take. This means that remedying their situation demands a thorough consideration of social and economic forces that affect how any possible solutions play out in practice.

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[18] Nobue Suzuki, "Between Two Shores: Transnational Projects and Filipina Wives in/from Japan," Women's Studies International Forum 23, no. 4, 2005: 137.

[19] Lucy Williams, "Migrant Life/ Married Life" in Global marriage Cross-border Marriage Migration in Global Context (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[20] Nobue Suzuki, "Between Two Shores: Transnational Projects and Filipina Wives in/from Japan," Women's Studies International Forum 23, no. 4, 2005: 435.

More importantly, academic discourse and conscious policy making that seek to meaningfully address the disadvantaged role of migrant brides must construct them as "deserving subjects of rights".[21] Such positioning requires their recognition independent from their spouses and children, and acceptance of the differentiated means through which citizenship operationalizes, so that inclusive, well rounded solutions can be deliberated upon.

[21] Hsiu-Yu Fan, "Female migrant spouses as deserving subjects of rights: migrant women and Taiwan's gender-equal courtrooms" in International Marriages and Marital Citizenship: Southeast Asian Women on the Move, eds. Asuncion Fresnoza-Flot and Gwénola Ricordeau. (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019).

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India and its Troubled Frontier:

The Case of Naga Separatism

Lalchhanhimi Bungsut

Abstract

This paper examines the factors that have led to polarization between the State and the subject in the case of the Naga people of Northeast India. In particular, I look at the role of Indian state's post-colonial cartographic anxiety in the intensification of militarization in the Naga-inhabited regions of the Northeast. In this paper, I first trace the history of the relationship between the Indian state and the Naga people from colonial India to the modern era. Then, I ask: how did the Naga struggle for a sovereign nation shape India's attempts at nation-building and its relationship with its Northeastern frontier regions? What does India's anxiety of losing Naga-inhibited regions reveal about the attempt to build a national identity through cartographic stability? First, I draw on the theory of 'cartographic anxiety' by Sankaran Krishna, best understood as the state's attempt to build a national identity through stable borders, indicating its reluctance to let go of its colonial legacy as represented by India's arbitrarily demarcated borders. In its attempt to produce stable borders, I argue that the state has ironically disrupted the lives of many by increasing military presence in its peripheral regions through the controversial Armed Forces Special Power Act, 1958 (AFSPA). The Act gives the military legal authority to act with impunity which normalizes violence through the rhetoric of protecting national interests. Consequently, the state wages a war against its own people and produces exceptions to citizenship that continues to threaten and alienate a historically marginalized population. With its attempt to establish hegemonic power throughout the region, the state has induced fervent and violent ethno-nationalism as seen through the Naga insurgency movement and the acts of civilians themselves. Ethno-nationalist sentiments show the Naga people's unwillingness to recognize the state's legitimate authority over their affairs which, for them, warrants a sovereign

nation based on ethnic and cultural distinctions. This paper is not aimed at deciphering whether the Naga people's claim for a sovereign nation is justified or not. Rather, it is an inspection of state power as it plays out in its frontier regions: the mutual recognition necessary between subject and state, the resistance to its power, and the legitimacy it requires.

Keywords: Cartography, Militarization, Borders, Citizenship, Ethno-nationalism

I. Introduction

Although a peripheral region by geography, the Northeast has been central to the political discourse of India ever since it was brought into the Indian Union following independence. Most notably, the Naga struggle for an independent nation has plagued politicians at the Center as well as Nagas spread across Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and parts of Myanmar. This essay will provide an account of both the history and present state of affairs concerning the Naga struggle for an independent Nagalim (Greater Nagaland). It will argue that the Naga nationalist struggle has threatened the attempts of India's nation-building process and increased the cartographic anxiety that has accompanied the nation's post-colonial reality. India has historically met this struggle with increased militarization and continues to do so, thus further alienating the Nagas from the state and inducing violent ethnonationalism.

In order to demonstrate this, this paper will first explore the history of pre-independence India and the administration of British rule in the Naga Hills. It will then proceed to examine the Nehruvian era in which India struggled with cartographic anxiety as it attempted to build itself up as a pluralistic democracy in the wake of its decolonization. Next, my paper will explicate militarization as a state response to Nagas'

assertion for a sovereign nation. This then led to the further alienation of the Nagas, emphasized their push for separation, and cemented their ethnonationalist sentiments.

I will draw my theoretical framework from essays by Sankaran Krishna on cartographic anxiety, Haley Duschinski on militarization, and Kathryn Verdery on ethnonationalism to build a narrative that connects all three works and explains the Naga struggle from its history to the present and conclude with how it may shape the future. The final section of this paper will investigate the possible trajectories the future of the Naga struggle could take. Although the Naga struggle has widely been documented, particularly of the effects of militarization on civil life and the insurgency movement as a whole, it has not been analyzed through the framework of cartographic anxiety before. Therefore, this perspective can better equip us to understand state-subject relations and identity politics at the border.

II. Historical Context

In order to understand the root of the Naga nationalist struggle, it is essential to look at the history of the relationship between the Nagas and the Indian state. The knowledge of Naga history largely stemmed from British colonizers who entered and intervened in the Naga Hills from 1840 – 80[1]. Initially a part of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) determined by the British, the colonizing forces did little to interfere with the Naga way of living. The British were careful not to impede on Naga affairs and allowed tribal councils to have authority over their village affairs[2]. Given their separation from the rest of India, the Nagas were not as involved in the struggle for Indian independence. However, with the exit of the British, power over the Naga Hills was reallocated to the Indian Union. The seemingly arbitrary integration of the Naga Hills into the newly independent Indian state sparked claims for self-determination and sovereignty. Under the leadership of the Naga National Council (NNC) and its leader, Angami Zapu Phizo, the Naga political assertion

[1] Sanghamitra Misra, "The Nature of Colonial Intervention in the Naga Hills, 1840-80," Economic and Political Weekly 33, no. 51 (December 1995): pp. 3273-3279, 3274.

[2] Udayon Misra, "The Naga National Question," Economic and Political Weekly 13, no. 14 (April 18, 1978): pp. 618-624, 619.

for self-determination arose based on claims of cultural and ethnic differences from mainland India. It materialized through a continuous insurgency that involved different factions of separatist groups and calls for a separate Naga nation that persists even today.

III. India and its post-colonial catrographic anxiety

Following its independence from the British, India's nation-building process struggled with what Sankaran Krishna calls "cartographic anxiety.", Cartographic anxiety, understood through Krishna's Mapping the Body Politic, is the Indian state's attempt to build a national identity through the production of stable borders. Sankaran describes India as "a society suspended forever in the space between the 'former colony'; and 'not-yet nation' …seen in the discursive production of India as a bounded, sovereign entity and the deployment of this in everyday politics and in the country's violent borders.[3]" The colonial legacy of the British remains, as India, glorified as a pre-existing civilizational entity, was demarcated by the colonizers and partitioned into two (now three) distinct nation-states. With the loss of large parts of its eastern and western frontier, India is seen as a "not-yet nation", one that is reluctant to let go of borders that were arbitrarily constructed during the colonial era as the state continues to assert its hegemonic sovereignty in its frontiers. By obsessing over the idea of national space and defined boundaries to "approximate a historical original that never existed," India persistently attempts to build a nation and "catch up" to its colonial predecessors.[4] Such anxiety was only worsened by the Naga assertion for sovereignty.

Even before India's independence, Jawaharlal Nehru had rightly predicted and feared the loss of its frontier regions. In addition to the coming Partition, the NNC had declared their will for a sovereign nation and even declared the independence of the Nagas living in various parts of India on 14 August 1947. Preceding their declaration of independence,

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[3] Sankaran Krishna, "Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politic in India," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 19, no. 4 (1994): pp. 507-521, https://doi.org/10.1177/030437549401900404, 508.

[4] Ibid., 517.

Nehru had received a resolution of NNC from their then secretary, T. Sakhrie. The resolution did not claim for separation from India, but instead asked for autonomy and safeguards for the Nagas[5]. Intent on building a nation that embraced diverse entities, Nehru duly responded with promises of maximum autonomy and a lack of intervention in the tribal affairs of the region[6] . Despite the seemingly peaceful agreement between the two, a plebiscite carried out by the NNC in 1951 claimed that 99 percent of the Nagas were in favor of establishing a sovereign Naga nation. With the success of the Pakistan movement, Nagas had "constructed a separate nationhood" for themselves, arguing that they were never a part of India, as "it was the British, and not the Indians, who had conquered them."[7]Such sentiments were highlighted by the plebiscite which preceded the refusal to participate in India's first parliamentary elections in 1952, by which time secessionist sentiments dominated the Naga rhetoric[8] . Thus, such events became the building block of the Naga national movement and the consequential insurgency movements led by the NNC, thereby shattering Nehru's dream of peacefully transforming India into a pluralistic society. In his paper, Krishna acknowledges the struggle that India faces in determining boundaries with foreign players, those from the outside, markedly Pakistan and China, but does not pay close attention to the threat produced from inside the state. This is where my paper fills the gap in scholarship, showing how internal threats to seemingly settled boundaries are created by the state's subjects.

The separatist claims of the Nagas from within the body politic, both historically and currently, significantly worsens India's cartographic anxiety. The Nagas lived in the Naga Hills (what became the state of Nagaland), parts of its neighboring states, and its neighboring country Myanmar. With the threat of separation, India faced a possible loss of a large chunk of its northeastern frontier. Additionally, an important border with the neighboring state of Myanmar would be carved out, thus debilitating India's attempt to build a nation through the security of its border regions. The continued instability of the

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[5] Sajal Nag, "Nehru and the Nagas: Minority Nationalism and the Post-Colonial State" 44, no. 49 (December 5, 2009).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Sajal Nag, "Nehru and the Nagas: Minority Nationalism and the Post-Colonial State" 44, no. 49 (December 5, 2009): pp. 50

[8] Dolly Kikon, "Engaging Naga Nationalism: Can Democracy Function in Militarised Societies?," Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 26 (2005): pp. 2833-2837, 2833.

region heightens the fear that India has of losing both territory and with it, its national integrity[9]. Consequently, India vehemently tries to assert itself as a hegemonic power in the Nagas' territory, inducing violent insurgencies, and responding with militarization.

In addition to India's fear of losing its territorial integrity, the Naga struggle has led to the fallout of India's territorial model into its subnational entities. Cartographic anxiety has pervaded into states like Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh, as the Naga claim for Nagalim includes territories in their states. The demands of NNC's successor, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), for a sovereign nation that covers 1,20,000 sq. km. area of land as opposed to the current 16,527 sq. km. area of Nagaland threatens the territory of its neighbors. Voices from the surrounding Northeastern states have spoken out against the demands of the NSCN, one of which is Lurinjyoti Gogoi, general secretary of the All Assam Students' Union (AASU), the largest student's association from Assam. In a statement to the Hindustan Times, Gogoi states: "We have nothing against the Naga issue getting resolved, but it should not be at the cost of Assam's integrity"[10]. As the Assamese state's integrity heavily relies on its human-made boundaries, it is a striking example of cartographic anxiety playing out on the subnational level. The anxiety can be seen to seep into the internal borders like a contagious disease of the post- colonial host, increasing the insecurities that the seemingly arbitrary boundaries within India foster.

IV. Militarization and its effects

As previously mentioned, India has tried to allay its cartographic anxiety, particularly in the Naga-inhabited areas, through increased militarization, legitimizing the state's use of force against its people. The heavy presence of military forces has produced social suffering and discontent among civilians distinct from the insurgent factions of the Nagas. Militarization, in this context, can be defined as "the contradictory and tense social

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[9] Sankaran Krishna, "Cartographic Anxiety," 511.

[10] "Now, Fresh Fears in NE over Territory Getting Ceded to Greater Nagalim." Hindustan Times, October 25, 2017. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/now-fresh-fears-in-ne-over-territory-getting-ceded-to-greater-nagalim/story-2n3sYpu30xBWCshatFjIXN.html.

process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence"[11]. Drawing from Haley Duschinski's *Destiny's Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley*, militarization by the state can be seen in its production of materials such as various forms of weaponry, and discursive methods such as the glorification of the military, enacted to prepare society for war. Militarization then seeps into institutional domains such as the political, judicial, economic, and familial, and pervades the lives of both combatants and those not involved in military conducts[12]. Not only does militarization pervade the everyday lives of the state's subjects, but the state also consciously glorifies and necessitates the militarization of regions deemed hostile and legitimizes violence against its people through the rhetoric of protecting national security and maintaining law and order[13]. In such a context, it is important to ask: what does order mean, who does it serve and why is it so important to the state? Here, order is synonymous with the desires of the state to have stable boundaries and protected territories and serves such desires through militarization that serves the state over ordinary subjects. Such a process of militarization is prevalent in the enforcement of military presence in the Naga-inhabited areas from the 1950s till today.

The Naga national struggle is no stranger to violence, both internally created and externally enforced. Although Nehru imagined a plural Indian nation built upon the celebration of its diversity, the Nagas desired a separate nation based on the very ethnic and cultural difference that set them apart from mainland Indians. In a letter to T.Sakhrie, Nehru announced the path that the Nagas must take in light of India's independence:

> "It is obvious that the Naga territory in Eastern Assam is much too small to stand by itself politically or economically. It lies between two huge countries, India and China. Inevitably therefore the Nagas must form a part of India and of Assam with which it has developed such close".[14]

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[11] Haley Duschinski, "Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley," Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 3 (2009): pp. 691-717, https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.0.0072.

[12] Ibid., 693.

[13] Ibid., 694.

[14] Subir Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's North East (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2015), 93.

Nehru's mistake in trying to incorporate the Nagas into the Indian Union was perhaps his assertion that it was "inevitable" for them to enter the Union and gave them little choice in their incorporation into Assam. Despite several attempts at drawing an agreement to resolve the separatist demands, the NNC ultimately formed an armed wing called the "Naga Army" that began to engage in guerrilla warfare against the state[15]. Broken into factions of underground rebels all across the Northeast, the Naga insurgency was a clear threat to the Indian state, and the police force in the region was simply inadequate to contain the potential violence. Therefore, the Indian army initially supported the Assam Rifles paramilitary troops that countered the insurgency groups, but as the violence became widespread, the Indian state eventually enforced the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 1958.

AFSPA, a provisional law enacted in response to the "disturbances" caused by various insurgencies in the Northeast, clearly reflects the ideology of militarization. Enforced across various states as a temporary measure in the face of emergency crises, AFSPA continues to operate in Nagaland to date. It provides substantial power to the armed forces in the region and allows them "to arrest and enter property without warrant and to 'fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area' if that officer believes it necessary 'for the maintenance of public order.'" [16] Therefore, the implementation of AFSPA legitimizes the state's use of violence against civilians to ensure civil security and proves the arbitrary and somewhat paradoxical nature of the state. Consequently, the state has allowed for human rights violations with impunity as its ideological production of threats amongst its citizens in the region justifies them.

Militarization has managed to disrupt social, economic, and political processes in the Naga-inhabited regions of the Northeast under the guise of countering insurgencies and

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[15] Ibid., 94.

[16] Haley Duschinski, "Destiny Effects," 701.

maintaining national security. The disruption is prevalent in the changes made to village relationships and the economic processes that used to define Naga society. As the Naga nationalists mainly gained their authority through tribal councils, the military sought to diminish the viability of tribal councils and village linkages themselves. This meant the arbitrary regrouping of villages which disturbed land-relationships between various village republics and diminished the longstanding economic relationships that existed between them[17]. While achieving its announced goal of diminishing the insurgents' support bases, it has also destroyed the very livelihoods and traditional relationships that served as the backbone of Naga society. The call to re-build such traditional political institutions and relationships, and restore Naga society's past glory has played an essential role in invoking national consciousness for the Nagas.

In addition to the disruption of traditional economic and political procedures, militarization of Naga-inhabited areas has led to social suffering for the Nagas, including those who are not involved in the insurgency movements themselves. Due to impunity enjoyed by military forces under AFSPA, violence against Nagas is legitimized and cast outside the protection of the state. Most notably, violence inflicted upon women has proven the arbitrary nature of the state's militarization tactics; rather than inflicting violence to maintain security and protect sovereignty, the tactics have more to do with instilling fear and disrupting social structures. Reports of rape and sexual harassment by armed forces in the Naga inhabited regions have been well-documented by national human rights reports, women's rights organizations, and activists. The use of sexual violence against women extended beyond those believed to have links to insurgent groups and included"rape of school-aged girls…abduction and subsequent rape of women and girls from their homes, including gang rape."[18] What is perhaps just as detrimental as the perpetration of such acts is the state's provision of "de jure impunity in that members of the armed forces are not prosecuted in civilian courts, and under the provisions of the act

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[17] Udayon Misra, "The Naga National Question," 621.

[18] Duncan Mcduie-Ra, "Violence Against Women in the Militarized Indian Frontier," Violence Against Women 18, no. 3 (2012): pp. 322-345, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801212443114, 332.

[AFSPA] violence against women is not deemed criminal."[19] The violation of human rights by state-appointed armed forces in Naga-inhabited areas shows how the boundary between a combatant and civilian gets blurred in a militarized society. Systematic violence against civilians becomes legitimized, even seen as necessary, to prepare the state against a potential threat even before such threats appear. The state accepts acts of violence against innocent people, in this case, sexually assaulted women, as "collateral damage" a term historically reserved for casualties of citizens in war, necessary for national security[20] Thus, through the militarization of Naga-inhabited regions, the Indian state wages war against its people and produces exceptions of citizenship that leave the Nagas powerless to the state that is supposed to protect them.

V. Naga ethnonationalism

Although the Indian state implemented militarization as a means to disarm insurgency movements and quell separatist sentiments, it has further alienated the Nagas from the state and induced ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism is what Verdery refers to as a "superimposition" of nationalism and ethnicity. In her paper, Verdery seeks to understand how ethnonationalism becomes a fallout of "social disarray," where the links that once held a network of people together fall apart and take on two primary forms: separatism and xenophobia. Drawing on Eric Hobsbawm's work, Verdery describes the nation as "an element of the relation between state and subject, understood as a cultural relation." The nation then takes on two forms: one of citizenship characterized by the "collective sovereignty based upon common political participation" and one of ethnicity consisting of a collective with "supposedly common language, history, or broader cultural identity."[21] In these distinctions, the nation becomes constructed (for a nation is always socially constructed) through two different conceptions of national identity: learned and primordial[22] While both conceptions rely on social categories that define and distinguish a group based on their exclusive social relations, the conception of a "learned" identity relies on

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Haley Duschinski, "Destiny Effects," 703.

[21] Catherine Verdery, "Comment: Hobsbawm in the East," Anthropology Today 8, no. 1 (February 1992): pp. 8-10, 8.

[22] Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," International Review of Social History 40, no. S3 (1995): pp. 1-17, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020859000113586, 10.

the belief that group identity is socially constructed with no fixed origin or boundary. On the other hand, the conception of a "primordial" identity is more rigid in that it emphasizes the role of descent characterized by a common ethnicity, thereby portraying group identity with a fixed and static boundary. When a nation is based on collective citizenship, nationalism stems from the support and devotion to the nation and the assertion of an exclusive superiority over others. Ethnonationalism, in contrast, stems from the attempt to unify over shared ethnic features, such as those previously mentioned, and a fierce protectiveness of one's nation from a constructed "other," often in the form of another ethnic group. The distinction between the asserted common identity of Nagas and their separation from the Indian mainland "other" reveals India's attempt to accommodate differences in its model of democratic pluralism as well as the Naga separatist sentiments.

In order to place the Naga freedom struggle in context, it is difficult to impose Verdery's conceptualization of ethnonationalism based on broken links in a relationship between the state and its subjects. To place her definition in the context of the Naga struggle would be to assert that there was a common thread that bound the Indian state to the Nagas in the first place, although the lack of one seemed to be the cause for separatist sentiments. On the other hand, the Nagas' attempt to separate from the Indian state shows the severed link, however contested, between the state and its subjects. The cultural relation, therefore, between the state and subject becomes weakened through pronounced ethnic differences and the state's active marginalization of its subjects through militarization. Arguably, Nehru conceived of India as a nation built upon citizenship and collective political participation, and aimed to induce a sense of nationalism through a constructed group identity inclusive of all. On the other hand, Naga separatists have chosen to emphasize their right to a sovereign nation based on a conceived "primordial" ethnicity. However, such an understanding of a nation has been widely contested as

various tribal groups, spread over a vast geography and speaking widely different dialects, came together to construct what became the Naga identity[23]. What is clear, however, is the role militarization has played in creating strife amongst the Nagas and uniting them against the state. Although Nehru's intentions for including the Nagas might have been justified, the enactment of laws that allowed for militarisation was counterproductive, and simply drove the Nagas away from Nehru's objective of integrating them into the Indian state. By allowing for legalized violence and atrocities to be inflicted against the Nagas, the Indian state has further fueled the "social disarray" amongst the Nagas and alienated itself as an "other" to invoke ethnonationalism.

Ethnonationalism has taken both a political and mundane manifestation for the Nagas. At the forefront of political manifestations are separatist groups such as the NNC or NSCN, who have fought to gain sovereignty through official recognition of the Indian state. While trying to liberate the Nagas from India through claims of ethnic and cultural distinctions, separatist factions have collided with the Indian government across time and political parties, from Nehru in the wake of Independence till Modi today. While the Shillong Accord, signed in 1975 between the government under Indira Gandhi and NNC leaders, forced the NNC to give up arms and signified the beginning of peace talks, the NSCN revived the armed movements in the NNC's absence[24]. Naga peace talks have still not been concluded to date as the NSCN stands firm in its demands, proving the fervent sentiment of separatism that persists amongst the Nagas. Through the course of Naga ethnonationalism, the political discourse between separatist groups and the government has been the most pertinent and well-documented platform for their assertions. This is mostly due to the inherently political nature of their claim to a sovereign nation beyond what the Indian state has to offer and the necessity to involve the government in the provision of their demands. That being said, ethnonationalism has also transcended beyond the political realm and exhibited itself in the actions of civilians.

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[23] Kaba Daniel, "Politics of Nationalism: Insider's Views of Pan-Naga Ethnic Community's Nationality Question in Ethnic Boundary Line," International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology 2, no. 17 (July 2013): pp. 135-160, 148.

[24] Subir Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery, 98.

In addition to the insurgent factions in the broader political arena, regular Naga citizens have also taken part in the separatist movement, showing the potency of the ethnonationalist sentiment. Historically, the mobilization of social groups such as the Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and religious organizations such as the Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC) have contributed to the Naga claim for self-determination and a sovereign nation. The NSF even published their own constitution in 1984 in which they asserted their will and right to safeguard their culture and traditional heritages from the Indian state [25]. Another example comes from a recent celebration of the 73rd Naga Independence Day in Manipur. As the Indian Express reports: "The celebration started with hosting of the 'Naga National Flag'…, followed by speeches from the leaders of Naga civil bodies, and singing of 'Naga National Anthem'"[26]. The event was celebrated by a large crowd, more abundant this year than in previous years due to the revocation of special laws that protected Jammu and Kashmir from the intervention of the central government. The increased presence of armed troops in Jammu and Kashmir after the fallout of the state's actions led to a fear of the same occurring in Naga-inhabited regions. Therefore, in light of such fears, the ethnonationalist sentiment can be seen in the solidarity of the Nagas represented through their national flag and anthem. It is also pertinent in their decision to celebrate their independence from the British and the separation they hope to gain from the Indian state.

VI. Conclusion

The Naga struggle for a sovereign nation has been one of the greatest threats to India's nation-building process. India's attempt to secure its hegemonic power over its vast territory, particularly in its frontier regions, has displayed the cartographic anxiety that it has fostered in the wake of its independence. India has met this struggle, particularly in the Naga-inhabited regions of the Northeast, with militarization, pitting itself against its

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[25] Kaba Daniel, "Politics of Nationalism," 152.

[26] Jimmy Leivon, "Manipur: Nagas Celebrate Independence Day, Hoist 'Naga National Flag' across the State," The Indian Express, August 14, 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/manipur/manipur-nagas-celebrate-independence-day-hoist-naga-national-flag-across-the-state-5905839/.

citizens in a crude attempt to normalize violence through the rhetoric of protecting national interests. Such an attempt has greatly invoked the Naga national consciousness and alienated the state from its Naga subjects. The resulting ethnonationalism can be seen in the separatist movements, both in the official and civilian domains. As militarization persists in Nagaland and other regions of the Northeast, the dialogue between the Indian state and the Nagas has continued to be one of distrust and unease. By painting the Naga separatist sentiments as anti-national and terroristic by nature, the state has been able to legitimize its use of force and militarization. To a certain extent, however, the result has also been the production of the same anti-national sentiments amongst the Nagas that the state sought to avert in the first place, creating a perpetual cycle of violence between the two.

The problems between the state and the Nagas can be better comprehended by drawing the link between these three concepts -cartographic anxiety, militarization, and ethnonationalism- but what of the solution? Even without a viable solution, an attempt to analyze the relationship between the state and subject through the Naga struggle can have noteworthy implications. One of the implications is the need for recognition that the state draws from its subjects and vice versa. The Naga struggle serves as an indicator of the importance of the symbiotic relationship between the state and its subjects as the lack of understanding between the two has led to one of the longest standing insurgencies in India. Additionally, the continued resistance of the Nagas shows that the state cannot assert complete hegemonic power over its subjects. Even in the phase of brute force and dominance, we see grassroots mobilisation and resistance, and this is indicative of agency and ethnic consciousness possessed by subjects of a state. Furthermore, this also proves the necessity for the two- the state and the subject- to engage with one another for their legitimacy." The Naga peace talks, therefore, must be met with an understanding between the state and subject that is based upon mutual respect and recognition of one another.

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Book Review:

Enduring Uncertainty: Deportation, Punishment and Everyday Life

Book by Ines Hasselberg

New York, Berghahn Books, 2016, xiii+171 pp., ISBN 978-1-78533-022-3

The use of deportation as a tool to control migrant populations is part of many liberal democracies around the world. Deportation is often narrowly understood to be the event of removing foreign nationals from the host country, but for people who face deportation, it is a process that starts long before the actual physical expulsion takes place.

Ines Hasselberg's work *Enduring Uncertainty: Deportation, Punishment and Everyday Life* provides an anthropological perspective on the lives of the deportees who have been convicted of criminal offences in the UK. She explores the ways in which they experience "deportability" and throws light on the coping mechanisms deportees and their families adopt. She refers to them as "foreign-national offenders" as they are categorized in the UK immigration policies.

To understand how these policies impact the realities of people on the ground, she conducted her research in London over a period of 12 months in 2009. The research participants were from diverse backgrounds: they belonged to different counties, cultures, religions, and age groups. What tied them together was their precarious relationship with the state. Apart from that, they had lived in the UK for a considerable period of time (ranging from four to fifty years and most of them were legal residents),[1] and their financial status before facing deportation ranged from surviving on benefits to coming from middle-class families.

[1] Legal residents are not citizens of their host country, but permitted by procedure established through national law to reside in the country.

In the first chapter, there is a detailed inspection of the socio-political processes that are historically responsible for rendering migrants illegal and legitimizing their "deportability." Examining the underlying causes is important because foreign-national offenders were not systematically targeted for deportation until 2006. Historically, immigration laws always had provisions to deport foreign nationals on the grounds of national security, but it was not until the 20 th century that deportation policies were weaponized to control the flow of the migrant population. In the UK, a change in the ruling regime and the public being concerned over a large number of asylum seekers brought the question of deportation into the limelight. In 1997, deportation gained significance in the political agenda, and with the New Labour party's election into power, deportation policies that allowed for the expulsion of rejected asylum seekers and "undesirable" foreign nationals came into place. Hasselberg draws attention to an incident that occurred in 2006 where there was a visible public outcry over the news that in the last seven years, 1,023 foreign national prisoners were released without considering deportation. The tremendous public pressure led to a rethinking of policies for national security and also led to the resignation of the then home secretary, Charles Clarke. To restore the faith of the public in the government, UK Borders Act 2007 called for automatic deportation of foreign nationals who were sentenced to at least 12 months of imprisonment even if they possessed indefinite leave to remain— an immigration status that allows people to live in the UK without any time constraints.

In Chapters 2 and 3, the relationship between the migrant and the host state is analyzed through the various institutions that play a significant role in the deportation process. Hasselberg presents an ethnographic analysis of proceedings being held at the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) and how the appellants understand their deportation appeals. Before the introduction of the Immigration Act 2014, migrants had the choice to appeal against their deportation. However, after the introduction of the act, the state could deport a foreign national offender who was deemed 'harmful' before they were given the chance to appeal; exceptional cases include situations in which expulsions could result in death or torture. The only option they had in the aftermath of the implementation of the Act was to appeal from beyond the borders of the nation-state, where the absence of accessible legal aid made the navigation of legal procedures even more difficult.

Detentions, the participants revealed, would come unexpectedly and would leave them confused and shocked. They were detained right after they served the prison sentences they were convicted for or when they were reporting to the Home Office as part of their bail conditions. Some were interrogated in the reporting centers for hours together only to be informed that they were being taken away to an Immigration Removal Centre (IRC). IRCs played a crucial role in migrant surveillance and the respondents felt that this kind of surveillance was done to sabotage their normal lives and force them to give up their plans on staying in the UK. Thus, prisons, detention centers, reporting centers, Home Office, and Asylum and Immigration Tribunals (AIT) emerge as spaces where the state exerts its power over the migrant body.

In chapter 4, the author focuses on how deportation affects the everyday lives of the deportee and their sense of self. It also throws light on the coping mechanisms of the family members in the face of their deportation. Seeking recourse to religion, volunteer work, and counseling helped ease the tension a little bit for the respondents and their family members while they were waiting for closure to the deportation process.

In her last chapter, Hasselberg explores why her respondents usually do not protest, and when they do protest, what are the ways in which they resist the state's will to deport them. For her respondents, to protest was to come out publicly as someone who was convicted of a criminal offense and was being deported by the state for it, which they believed would not lead to any kind of public sympathy. This could add to their problems if the Home Office considered accelerating their deportation process or put them under detention on grounds that they were being "inconvenient" (pg. 129). Thus, for respondents, the process of removal followed by the state leaves no possibility for collective action. The Anti-Deportation Campaigns (ADC's) that come out in support of migrants facing deportation have no established guidelines when it comes to foreign national offenders. Examining the strategies of resistance adopted by the respondents, the author concludes that they act in accordance with the orders of the state. This is a strategic choice migrants take: by complying with state orders, migrants navigate an arguably unfair process as "reasonable" and non-threatening individuals, thereby making it challenging for the state to deem them as dangerous individuals that need to be deported.

This book is a testament to the fact that the state does not perceive all humans as human. While it remains unproven if convicted foreign nationals pose a greater risk to the society upon release, relative to convicts who are British nationals, the state attempts to deport the former because the convergence of criminal and immigration laws creates a legal landscape where such injustice can be justified. This suggests that the state often employs arbitrary and disproportionate thresholds, in this case employing a verdict of criminality as the sole metric to assess the suitability of foreign nationals to live within its national territory, thus using it as a means to control migrant inflow. Secondly, the contingent nature of the binaries of citizen/foreigner, home/abroad, us/them, deserving/undeserving upon geographical markers is today increasingly being challenged and thus, the presupposition made by the state in deporting these foreign convicts– that they are being sent back "home," without evaluating the nature of their relationship with the country that they left– appears indefensible. Overall, this work engages with a virtually undocumented yet central aspect of the way in which immigration policies are designed to keep migrants from settling in host countries.

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

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